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Abstract 
Veto threats may offer presidents bargaining leverage, but such leverage will be 
diminished if they and those with whom they transact business view a veto as hurting the 
president’s approval rating and his party’s prospects in the next election.  How concerned must 
presidents be about the audience costs associated with a veto?  Political science research 
suggests that they should be in that the public does not like vetoes and punishes presidents when 
they exercise this authority. In this article we test this argument with survey responses during 
times after presidents have issued a veto threat but before an actual veto. While on average, 
respondents register opposition to a veto, this preference varies greatly with the specific policy 
in question and with respondents’ party identification and presidential approval.  The results 
suggest that opposition to a veto comes disproportionately, may be limited to politically distant 
respondents, and thus may not be as costly as the net negative numbers suggest.  
During the past several decades divided party control of Congress and the presidency and 
the resulting gridlock have defined politics in Washington.  As presidents resist opposition 
majorities in Congress, they have been quick to issue veto threats. Occasionally, they have 
followed up their threats with actual vetoes. Various research suggests that presidents absorb 
serious audience costs when they rely on this Constitutional instrument. Groseclose and McCarty 
(2001) construct a model of an opposition-Congress strategy that has it send presidents popular 
legislation they are committed to vetoing.1  Although the conditions necessary to set up this bind 
are probably exceptional – after all, presidents will be disinclined to box themselves in by 
committing to veto popular policies – the authors report evidence supporting their hypothesis 
that Congress’ selection strategy accounts for the losses in presidents’ approval ratings. After 
vetoing major bills, their approval rating drops an estimated 2 percentage points (Groseclose and 
McCarty 2001).   
Recently, a different rationale has been offered for expecting vetoes to take a toll on 
presidents’ public support. The public simply does not like for presidents to act unilaterally 
(Reeves and Rogowski 2015, 2016). Across a variety of scenarios – such as, initiating military 
action and issuing executive orders – a plurality of survey respondents regard presidents’ 
unilateral actions with circumspection.  More respondents than not even disapprove of 
presidential vetoes to block legislation approved “by both chambers of Congress.”2 Although 
respondents’ party identification and evaluation of the current president’s job performance color 
their views, the findings indicate a general aversion to “presidential power that exist apart from 
their partisan proclivities” (Reeves and Rogowski 2015: 756).  In sum, the public does not like 
for occupants of the office to act unilaterally.  Yet, when Sievert and Williamson (2018) asked 
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respondents the extent to which they agreed with this use of the veto in the 2016 Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study, they found a majority supported use of this power. 
So, how do Americans respond as they watch presidents threaten to veto the opposition 
majority’s legislation?  This is a timely question because recent presidents have shown an ever-
growing willingness to do so.  Since their introduction in 1985, OMB’s Statements of 
Administration Policy (SAPs) have become a favorite vehicle for presidents to issue veto threats 
to Congress. Presidents explicitly threatened 818 bills with a veto during the thirty-year period 
ending in 2014. Early evidence suggests that presidents’ growing reliance on veto threats is well 
justified. Presidents have succeeded in knocking about half of the objectionable provisions out of 
both appropriations (Hassell and Kernell 2016) and authorization bills (Guenther and Kernell 
Forthcoming).  
The prospect that the public would greet their veto with disapproval raises a serious 
strategic issue for presidents contemplating whether and how to respond to unwelcomed, 
opposition legislation. As they levy these threats, should presidents discount any negotiating 
leverage they confer by lingering audience costs that could undermine their and their party’s 
success in the next election?  
In this article we perform several exercises that test the public’s support for vetoes and 
veto threats across a variety of issues and political settings.  The results offer more sanguine 
prospects for presidents’ selective use of veto threats in negotiating with opposition majorities in 
Congress. The first exercise analyzes 26 commercial public opinion surveys from 1947 through 
2007 that ask respondents if the president should make good on a veto threat of a bill that 
Congress is poised to pass. The second exercise draws serendipitously on one of the above 
survey’s follow up questions on the importance of a bill’s party sponsorship on respondents’ 
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support for a veto. The third exercise pools the subset of the above surveys that include 
partisanship and estimates multivariate models parsing the relative effects of partisanship, 
approval, education, and party cues.  These exercises indicate that opposition will be greatest 
where the president’s support is already weak. With few exceptions, their core constituency has 
their back when presidents confront opposition Congresses. 
Exercise 1. Public Support for Veto Threats of Specific Legislation 
It is one thing for a survey respondent to favor or oppose an abstract principle about 
appropriate presidential actions and quite another to do so when specific policies and party 
commitments are on the line.3   From  the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research’s survey 
archive we located 36 questions in 26 national surveys taken between 1947 and 2015 that asked 
respondents whether or not the president should make good on his threat to veto a specific bill.4  
(For more information about these survey items, see Appendix A.) Figure 1 reports that on 
average 39 percent supported and 48 percent opposed the use of a veto with 12 percent either not 
knowing or choosing a third option.  So, the basic distributions lend credence to the claim that 
more respondents tend to oppose than support use of the veto. Yet, the distributions in Figure 1 
also reveal that Americans do not automatically oppose threatened vetoes. On 9 of the 36 
questions, all occurring during the Clinton presidency, at least 50 percent of respondents favored 
vetoing a particular bill.5 Clinton also managed to round up the lowest level of support in any of 
our surveys when only 10 percent endorsed his 1999 threat to veto a Democrat-sponsored bill to 
expand prescription drug coverage for Medicare recipients.  The next lowest support for a veto 
was 14 percent, the figure agreeing with George W. Bush’s veto threat of the bipartisan McCain 
Feingold campaign finance reform bill.6  In sum, the wide range of responses to veto threats in 
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Figure 1 clearly presents respondents as considering the pros and cons of a policy in judging this 
particular use of the president’s veto authority.   
[Figure 1 About Here] 
In Figure 2 we report the results of fifteen of the questions in surveys that ask whether the 
president should use his veto pen and also include the respondent's partisan affiliation. In seven 
of these fifteen polling questions, at least half of Americans support the use of the veto (although 
six of these seven are related to the same bill – health care).  However, partisanship clearly 
influences opinions.  For ten of the 15 polling questions, a majority of the president's co-
partisans support use of the veto.  The number of polls indicating majority support for a veto 
drops to eight for independents and to two among opposition party respondents.  Further, in all 
but one instance support for a veto was substantially higher among the president's co-partisans 
(averaging 54 percent) than among independents (averaging 43 percent) and opposition partisans 
(averaging 29 percent).7   
[Figure 2 About Here] 
An examination of legislative histories suggests this support from co-partisans emboldens 
presidents to follow through when needed and can even persuade Congress to capitulate.  For all 
but one of the 21 bills asked about in Figure 1, we were able to identify the relevant bills and 
their fates.  Ten bills were vetoed, seven died in Congress, and three became law.  Among the 
seven bills covered by questions in Figure 2, four were vetoed, three became law.  While 
Congress did attempt overrides for a few of the vetoes, all but one of these attempts (for the Taft-
Hartley Act in 1947) failed.  There was no significant difference in means in public support for 
vetoes across these fates. In sum, presidents do not need majority support from the public to 
prevail in legislative battles.   
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Exercise 2: Manipulating Partisan Sources of Bill Sponsorship 
To probe further into the impact of partisanship, we begin with the results of a 1999 
Gallup poll that includes an experimental feature by asking respondents two hypothetical 
questions on vetoing tax cuts that are designed to elicit attitudinal differences based on party 
identification. Both questions, reproduced in Table 1, ask about a bill that would cut taxes by 
hundreds of billions over a ten-year period. The first presents a Republican-sponsored bill that 
would cut $800 billion in taxes; the second refers to a Democratic bill that would more modestly 
pare $300 billion in taxes. Although the varying dollar amounts is unfortunate for establishing a 
controlled environment, it arguably better reflects the political parties’ well-established, differing 
stances on taxes.  Yet in that both involve large tax cuts, and all other details are the same, except 
for the party identified as sponsoring it, we are afforded an opportunity to see how party 
referents orient attitudes toward veto threats.  
[Table 1 About Here] 
 Overall support for a veto of the larger Republican sponsored tax bill is much greater 
than support for the Democratic sponsored tax bill.  To further disentangle the impact of 
partisanship, we conducted difference of means tests comparing the responses of Democrats, 
Republicans, and Independents to the two questions.  As Table 1 shows, while overall and 
among independents, support is significantly higher for a veto of the Republican-sponsored bill 
than for the Democratic sponsored bill, we see a different pattern emerge among partisans.  
Nearly twice as many Democrats support a veto of the Republican sponsored tax bill (51 percent 
than the one identified as Democrat-sponsored (26 percent). Meanwhile, 23 percent of 
Republicans supported a veto of the Democrat-sponsored bill compared to nearly 17 percent for 
the Republican one.8  The fact that Republicans are less interested in vetoing tax cuts, whatever 
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its partisan source, tell us that beyond partisan cues, respondents also consider the policy 
substance of the legislation.  
Exercise 3: Estimating Veto Support as a Function of Party and Policy 
Evidence abounds in the relationships uncovered thus far that partisanship and policy 
substance contribute heavily to the public’s posture on a veto. Are these two covariates all that 
matter and what do they tell us about attitudes toward presidents’ use of their veto authority? 
Drawing on irregular commercial surveys that contain different question formats and wordings 
for all the variables offers both advantages and disadvantages. The variety prevents controlling 
for the effects of the broader settings that vary over time; it does allow us, however, to examine 
(and reject) question wording as a source of bias in these responses.   
In Table 2, we estimate two multivariate models of veto support based on partisanship 
(measured with two dichotomous variables for the president’s party and the opposition party, 
with independents the omitted category) and job performance approval (measured as a 
dichotomous variable coded one for approve) while controlling for education (measured on a 
four point scale, from did not graduate high school to four or more years of college) and 
questions that specifically identify a bill as written by the president’s party(dichotomous 
measure).  Then, in Model 2, we further unpack how partisan variations among respondents and 
in the White House shape support for vetoes.9 
[Table 2 About Here] 
Repeated cross section designs such as these pose challenges for estimation.  Both 
temporal and spatial variation is likely.  While Lebo and Weber (2015) create a solution that 
accounts for both types of variation for continuous dependent variables, this approach cannot be 
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applied to ones that are binary.  We choose a modeling approach that accounts for the temporal 
variation through employing random effects logistic regression grouped by survey.10   
The average observed level of support for vetoes across all respondents in these surveys 
was 42 percent.  The results in Table 2 indicate that approval of the president increases the 
likelihood of supporting the president’s use of the veto.  Members of the president’s party are 
more likely to support a veto while members of the opposition party are less likely to support a 
veto compared to independents.  When the question identifies the bill as being written by the 
president’s party, support for a veto declines substantially.  In addition, education has a negative 
and statistically significant relationship with support for a veto.  This differs from Reeves and 
Rogowski’s (2015) and Sievert and Williamson’s (2018) finding that higher levels of education 
are associated with higher levels of support for the veto.  This makes sense since their question 
asked respondents to agree or disagree:  "The president should not be able to veto legislation that 
has been passed by both chambers of Congress."  Those with higher levels of education would be 
more likely to know that the Constitution gives the president this power. Yet, when it comes to 
support for specific vetoes, those with higher levels of education are actually less likely to 
support the president following through on his threat.  Finally, the results in Model 2 indicate 
that support for vetoes is higher when the president is a Democrat. 
To better understand the impact of these variables, we estimate predicted probabilities for 
specific covariates of interest in Figures 3 and 4. Holding education at its mean level and limiting 
estimates to bills not identified as sponsored by the president’s party, Figure 3 reports strong 
likelihood of endorsement among members of the president’s party, especially among those who 
approve of the president.  Among approvers of the president, the probability of supporting a veto 
is .65 among members of the president’s party, .53 among Independents, and .38 among 
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members of the opposition party. Meanwhile, disapproval of the president decreases opposition 
party members’ predicted probability of supporting a veto by just over 11 percentage points 
while it decreases the predicted probability of supporting a veto among Independents and 
members of the president’s party by nearly 13 percentage points.  The predicted probabilities 
suggest that regardless of approval, the president’s party is more likely than not to support the 
president’s veto.  Independents who approve are also more likely than not to support the 
president’s veto, although the lower 95 percent confidence interval for this estimate dips below 
50 percent.  Meanwhile, regardless of approval of the president, opposition party members are 
more likely than not to oppose the president’s veto.  Clearly, partisanship has a strong impact on 
the likelihood of supporting a veto and approval of the president only partially mitigates this 
influence.   
[Figure 3 About Here] 
The question remains whether this partisan-conditioned support for a veto changes based 
on which party holds the presidency.  Reeves and Rogowski (2015) found that Democrats were 
more likely to favor the president’s ability to use a veto.  While their question about the veto 
directs respondents to think “about the Office of the Presidency – and not any particular 
president,” a Democrat held the presidency at the time and this could influence Democrats’ 
higher support.  While Model 1 cannot help us identify whether there are differences in support 
for a veto based on whether the president’s and opposition party members are Democrats or 
Republicans, to explore those potential differences, we calculate predicted probabilities based on 
the results of Model 2, which includes a variable indicating the president’s party.  The predicted 
probabilities plotted in Figure 4 provides evidence of interesting if somewhat asymmetric party 
dynamics at work.  Figure 4a shows Democrats link their approval more closely to the party of 
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the president. They swing from 72 percent probability of approving when a Democrat they like is 
in the White House to 14 percent when a Republican they disapprove is president. Republican 
endorsements change less across these dimensions – 46 to 34 percent respectively in comparable 
situations. Yet, given that these survey questions only span two presidencies – Democrat Bill 
Clinton and Republican George W. Bush – more study is needed.   
[Figure 4 About Here] 
In Figure 4b we report these relationships for the highly unusual situation (occurring in 
only one survey) where the question identifies that the veto threat is directed at a bill proposed 
by the president’s congressional party.  Support for a veto drops dramatically in these situations.  
Yet, the results in Figure 4b show that the highest predicted probability of support for a veto 
against the president’s party was at .20 among Democrats who approve of their Democratic 
president.  Meanwhile, among Republicans who disapprove of the Democratic president, the 
probability of support for a veto is a miniscule .05.   In contrast, the predicted probability of 
support for a veto among Republicans who approve of their Republican president is only .05 and 
this drops to .02 among Democrats who disapprove of the Republican president.  Once again, 
Democrats exhibit larger changes in probability of support for a veto based on the president’s 
party and whether they approve of the president than do Republicans.  Our results also suggest 
that when respondents are told a bill is sponsored by the president’s party they are highly 
unlikely to support a veto of it.  This cue dramatically reduces the probability of support for a 
veto across the board.  While this finding needs additional investigation, it appears that 
opposition to this unilateral action heightens when the question informs respondents that the 
president is using this defensive weapon against his own party.   
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Conclusion: How the Public Chooses Sides 
Vetoes pit presidents against Congress.  Overall, when we average across all the survey 
questions over time, about 40% of Americans side with the president and support use of a veto.  
This suggests that in general, a majority do support letting the law passed by Congress prevail, 
and some bias against unilateral action by presidents.  However, when it comes to support for 
specific vetoes, Americans index their opinions by partisanship and approval.  Presidents can 
typically expect much greater support from their co-partisans and those who approve of their 
performance in office.  They can also expect those with lower levels of education to be slightly 
more likely to take their side, while those with higher levels of education are slightly more likely 
to support Congress in these battles.  We find support for vetoes also varies by the party of the 
president (and perhaps the president in office), a topic that merits further investigation beyond 
what our data allows.  The results suggest Democrats may be more strongly driven by party cues 
in their support for a veto while Republicans seem to have a strong core that opposes vetoes 
regardless of the president’s party.  Finally, the results based on the available commercial 
surveys suggest that Americans’ antipathy for the veto is strongest when used against policies 
promoted by the president’s own party.  This clearly deserves further study.  Still, the results 
show that bias against unilateral action in the form of a veto is far from uniform.  Instead, 
support for a veto is highly conditioned by political views and circumstances, a finding that 
comports better with the results of some recent experiments about presidents’ use of unilateral 
action (Reeves and Rogowski 2015; Reeves and Rogowski 2016; Christenson and Kriner 2017) 
than others (Reeves, Rogowski, Seo and Stone 2017).  In addition, we find little evidence this 
bias against unilateral action inhibits presidents from following through threats with acts.  As 
noted above, presidents vetoed ten of the threatened bills examined with these surveys, and 
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Congress backed away, failing to pass another seven of these bills. Presidents may face audience 
costs when using a veto, but these costs vary across audience members and across issues.  And it 
does not prevent presidents from issuing and executing veto threats.   
 
Figure 1. Support for President’s Veto of Specific Legislation 
 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1. How Support for Veto Changes by Party Sponsor of Bill* 


















If Congress passes 
a Republican-
sponsored bill to 
cut taxes by 
approximately 800 
billion dollars over 
the next 10 years, 
do you think 
President (Bill) 
Clinton should sign 
that bill into law, or 
should he veto the 














If Congress passes 
a Democrat-
sponsored bill to 
cut taxes by 
approximately 300 
billion dollars over 
the next 10 years, 
do you think 
President (Bill) 
Clinton should sign 
that bill into law, or 
should he veto the 










Results of Difference of Means 
Test Across Questions 
 t=2.92; 
p=.00 
t=4.78; p=.00 t=1.63; p=.05 t=-1.47; p=.07 
* Partisanship is determined by the question “In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a 
Democrat, or an Independent.”  Those who volunteered another party, said they don’t know, or refused to answer 
are not included in this table.  Don’t knows and refusals to answer the veto questions are treated as missing data.  In 
addition, mean support for Republicans, Democrats, and Independents are all significantly different from each other 
for the Republican-sponsored bill at the .00 level but their mean responses are not significantly different from each 









(1) (2)    
                      
 
                                      
Approval            0.521***           0.520*** 
                    (0.0442)           (0.0442)    
 
President’s Party          0.479***           0.479*** 
                    (0.0620)           (0.0620)    
 
Opposition Party         -0.619***          -0.619*** 
                    (0.0599)          (0.0598)    
 
Education             -0.0703***        -0.0696*** 
                    (0.0200)           (0.0200)    
 
Question Identifies Bill       -1.974***          -2.330*** 
Written by President’s Party (0.445)            (0.568)    
 
Democratic President                            1.127*** 
                                        (0.323)    
 
_cons                 -0.196             -0.977*** 
                     (0.217)            (0.280)    
 
lnsig2u                                      
_cons                 -0.625             -1.263**  
                     (0.387)            (0.386)    
 
N                      13589              13589    
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 





Figure 3.  Support for a Veto Based on Party and Approval 
 
The predicted probabilities in the figure above are generated from Model 1.  They are 
represented by dots in the figure above.  They represent the probabilities of an average person 
supporting a veto given specific covariate values (with the random effects term at 0).  To 
calculate each of these, education is set at its mean level and the question does not identify the 
bill as being written by the president’s party.  However, in order to generate confidence intervals 
for these predicted probabilities, the random effects term must be taken into account.  Thus, the 
lines above instead represent 95% confidence intervals for probabilities for a specific individual 
given the quantities of interest (in other words, the random effects term is not set to 0).  As a 
































Figure 4.  Predicted Probability of Approving of a Veto by President’s Party 
a. The Bill is Not Identified as Written by the President’s Party 
   
b.  The Bill is Identified as Written by the President’s Party 
  
The predicted probabilities in the figures above are generated from Model 2.  They are 
represented by dots in the figure above.  They represent the probabilities of an average person 
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Democratic President Republican President 
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calculate each of these, education is set at its mean level.  However, in order to generate 
confidence intervals for these predicted probabilities, the random effects term must be taken into 
account.  Thus, the lines above instead represent 95% confidence intervals for probabilities for a 
specific individual given the quantities of interest (in other words, the random effects term is not 







Appendix A: Support for Vetoes 







Feeling if Veto 
Third 
Option 
Gallup Poll Apr-47 
If a bill that cuts down labor's power a great 
deal is passed by Congress, would you like to 
have President Truman give it his okay or veto 
it? 
38 46 16 
Gallup Poll 
(AIPO) Jun-47 
Do you think that President (Harry) Truman 
should sign this labor bill (to regulate labor 
unions) or veto it (that is, refuse to approve it)? 
33 49 19 
Harris Poll Jul-91 
President Bush and the Democratic Congress 
have had major disagreements over bills the 
Congress has passed. As a result, he has 
vetoed or has threatened to veto many key 
bills. Let me read you several bills where that 
has happened.... Sharp cuts in defense 
spending.... Do you think President Bush is 
more right or more wrong to veto that bill? 
46 48 6 
Harris Poll Jul-91 
(President Bush and the Democratic Congress 
have had major disagreements over bills the 
Congress has passed. As a result, he has 
vetoed or has threatened to veto many key 
bills.) Let me read you several bills where that 
has happened.... The Civil Rights Act of 
1991.... Do you think President Bush is more 
right or more wrong to veto that bill? 
36 38 26 
Harris Poll Jul-91 
(President Bush and the Democratic Congress 
have had major disagreements over bills the 
Congress has passed. As a result, he has 
vetoed or has threatened to veto many key 
bills.) Let me read you several bills where that 
has happened.... A bill to repeal the Supreme 
Court decision prohibiting a doctor from 
discussing abortion with a patient in a federally 
funded family planning clinic.... Do you think 
President Bush is more right or more wrong to 
veto that bill? 
36 59 5 
Harris Poll Jul-91 
(President Bush and the Democratic Congress 
have had major disagreements over bills the 
Congress has passed. As a result, he has 
vetoed or has threatened to veto many key 
bills.) Let me read you several bills where that 
has happened.... A bill to allow parents to take 
12 week of unpaid leave after having a baby.... 
Do you think President Bush is more right or 
more wrong to veto that bill? 
34 63 3 
Harris Poll Jul-91 
(President Bush and the Democratic Congress 
have had major disagreements over bills the 
Congress has passed. As a result, he has 
vetoed or has threatened to veto many key 
bills.) Let me read you several bills where that 
has happened.... A bill to establish national 
health insurance paid for by the federal 
government, but which would not change the 
system of having private doctors and private 
hospitals.... Do you think President Bush is 
more right or more wrong to veto that bill? 
30 65 5 
Gallup Poll Oct-91 
Congress also passed a bill requiring 
companies to allow employees to take up to 12 
weeks unpaid leave if they had a new baby, or 
if there were a serious illness in their immediate 
family. President Bush has said he opposes the 
bill because it might hurt the economy and 
create too much government interference in 
44 53 3 
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business. Would you like to see Bush sign this 
bill into law, or do you think he should veto it? 
Gallup Poll Oct-91 
Congress recently passed a bill to extend 
unemployment benefits beyond the regular 26-
week period. To provide the 6.4 billion dollars 
needed to extend benefits, a budget 
emergency would have to be declared that 
President Bush says is not justified. Would you 
like to see Bush sign this bill into law, or do you 
think he should veto it? 






Suppose Congress passes a health care 
reform bill that does not guarantee health care 
coverage for all Americans. Do you think 
President (Bill) Clinton should veto such a bill 
or not? 
56 33 11 
Gallup/CNN/ 
USA Today Poll Jun-94 
Suppose Congress passes a bill which would 
improve the country's health care system, but 
would not guarantee coverage for every 
American. Do you think President (Bill) Clinton 
should veto the bill and send it back to 
Congress, or should he sign it? 





Suppose Congress passes a health care 
reform bill that does not guarantee health care 
coverage for all Americans. Do you think 
President (Bill) Clinton should veto such a bill 
or not? 





If Congress passes a health care plan that 
includes a number of health care reforms, but 
does not guarantee health insurance for all 
Americans, should President (Bill) Clinton sign 
the bill or veto the bill? 
65 26 9 
CBS News/New 
York Times Poll 
Sep-
94 
President (Bill) Clinton said in January (1994) 
that he would veto any health care bill that did 
not provide insurance for all Americans. If 
Congress passes a health care bill that 
improves insurance coverage, but does not 
provide coverage for everybody, should 
President Clinton sign it, or should he veto it? 






Do you think President (Bill) Clinton should veto 
legislation which would make changes such as 
these in environmental policy (expanding 
logging, mining, and ranching on public lands, 
reducing protection for endangered species, 
opening up the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 
in Alaska to oil and gas exploration), or don't 
you feel that way? 





As you may know, Republicans in Congress 
are in the process of passing a federal budget 
that they say will balance the budget in seven 
years and reduce taxes for most families. 
President (Bill) Clinton says he will veto the 
budget because he believes it cuts too much 
from certain domestic programs and gives tax 
breaks mostly to the wealthy. In your view, 
should the President sign or veto this budget? 






Do you think (President Bill) Clinton should sign 
the budget or veto it? 33 59 8 
Gallup/CNN/ 
USA Today Poll 
Nov-
95 
Currently the Republicans in Congress are in 
the final stages of completing an overall budget 
for the federal government. This is the budget 
bill that is intended to balance the federal 
budget within seven years, cut taxes, and cut 
the rate of spending on such programs as 
Medicare and Medicaid. From what you have 
heard or read so far about the Republican 
budget, do you think President (Bill) Clinton 
should sign the budget bill or should he veto it? 








Republicans in Congress are in the process of 
passing a federal budget that they say will 
balance the budget in seven years and reduce 
taxes for most families. President (Bill) Clinton 
says he will veto this budget because he 
believes it cuts too much from certain domestic 
programs and gives tax breaks mostly to the 
wealthy. In your view, should the President sign 
or veto this budget? 
56 36 8 
Gallup/CNN/ 
USA Today Poll 
Dec-
95 
As you may know, both houses of Congress 
have passed a bill to change the country's 
welfare system. Based on what you have read 
or heard about this bill, do you think President 
(Bill) Clinton should sign this bill or veto it? 
42 32 26 
Legislative 




Generally speaking, if Congress attaches riders 
which relax environmental regulations to 
legislation do you think President (Bill) Clinton 
should veto the legislation and send it back to 
Congress to be passed without the rider or 
should he sign the legislation into law? 
69 13 18 
Gallup Poll Aug-99 
If Congress passes a Republican-sponsored 
bill to cut taxes by approximately 800 billion 
dollars over the next 10 years, do you think 
President (Bill) Clinton should sign that bill into 
law, or should he veto the bill so it does not 
become law? 
30 63 7 
Gallup Poll Aug-99 
If Congress passes a Democrat-sponsored bill 
to cut taxes by approximately 300 billion dollars 
over the next 10 years, do you think President 
(Bill) Clinton should sign that bill into law, or 
should he veto the bill so it does not become 
law? 
26 65 9 
Gallup Poll Aug-99 
If Congress passes a Democrat-sponsored bill 
to expand Medicare coverage to include 
prescription drugs for Medicare recipients, do 
you think President (Bill) Clinton should sign 
that bill into law, or should be veto the bill so it 
does not become law? 





And, what do you think President (Bill) Clinton 
should do with this tax cut bill when Congress 
sends it to him... sign it into law, or veto it? 





And, what do you think President (Bill) Clinton 
should do with this tax cut bill when Congress 
sends it to him... sign it into law, veto it, or 
reach a compromise with the Republicans on a 
modified tax cut? 





Recently, the United States Senate passed a 
campaign finance bill sponsored by Senators 
John McCain and Russ Feingold that would 
ban so-called soft money contributions to the 
two national political parties, increase individual 
contribution limits, and restrict issue 
advertisements run by corporations, interest 
groups, and unions close to an election. Do you 
think that President (George W.) Bush should 
sign the bill or veto the bill, or do you not care 
either way? 





During the spring (2001), the United States 
Senate passed a campaign finance bill 
sponsored by Senators John McCain and Russ 
Feingold that would ban so-called soft money 
contributions to the two national political 
parties, increase individual contribution limits, 
and restrict issue advertisements run by 
corporations, interest groups, and unions close 
to an election. If the bill reaches President 
(George W.) Bush, do you think that he should 
sign the bill or veto the bill, or do you not care 
either way? 







During the spring (2001), the United States 
Senate passed a campaign finance bill that 
would ban so-called soft money contributions to 
the two national political parties, increase 
individual contribution limits, and restrict issue 
advertisements run by corporations, interest 
groups, and unions close to an election. If the 
bill reaches President (George W.) Bush, do 
you think that he should sign the bill or veto the 
bill, or do you not care either way? 






If Congress passes a law that allows the FDA 
(Food and Drug Administration) to regulate 
cigarettes, what would you expect President 
(George W.) Bush to do about it when it 
reaches the White House?...Reject it as an 
unacceptable compromise and veto it, view it 
as an acceptable compromise and sign it 






If Congress acts on a bipartisan basis to pass a 
law that allows the FDA (Food and Drug 
Administration) to regulate cigarettes, what 
would you want President (George W.) Bush to 
do with the bill?...Sign it into law, veto the bill 
31 57 12 
Gallup/USA 
Today Poll Apr-07 
As you may know, President (George W.) Bush 
has said he will veto a bill to expand federal 
funding for embryonic stem cell research. Do 
you think Bush should--or should not--veto this 
bill? 





Do you think President (George W.) Bush 
should veto legislation that sets a specific date 
for withdrawing US (United States) troops from 
Iraq, or not? 
44 48 8 




As you may know, Democrats in both houses of 
Congress passed legislation that ties further 
funding of the war in Iraq to targeted dates for 
withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq. (George 
W.) Bush says he will veto any measure that 
sets such a timetable because he believes it 
would tie the hands of battlefield commanders 
and make defeat in Iraq more likely. Do you 
think that Bush should sign a funding 
authorization that includes a timetable for 
withdrawal, or should he veto that legislation? 






If President (George W.) Bush decided to veto 
this (children's health) bill, would you favor or 
oppose his veto? 
45 45 10 
Fox News Poll Jan-15 
Do you think President (Barack) Obama should 
sign or veto legislation approving the building of 
the Keystone XL Pipeline that would transport 
oil from Canada to refineries in the United 
States? 




Appendix B: Party Status and Support for Vetoes 

















Mar-94 Suppose Congress passes a health 
care reform bill that does not guarantee 
health care coverage for all Americans. 
Do you think President (Bill) Clinton 
should veto such a bill or not? 
56 64 55 47 
Gallup/CNN/USA 
Today Poll 
Jun-94 Suppose Congress passes a bill which 
would improve the country's health 
care system, but would not guarantee 
coverage for every American. Do you 
think President (Bill) Clinton should 
veto the bill and send it back to 
Congress, or should he sign it? 
62 74 67 53 
Time/CNN/Yankelovich 
Partners Poll 
Jul-94 Suppose Congress passes a health 
care reform bill that does not guarantee 
health care coverage for all Americans. 
Do you think President (Bill) Clinton 
should veto such a bill or not? 
55 68 59 40 
NBC News/Wall Street 
Journal Poll 
Jul-94 If Congress passes a health care plan 
that includes a number of health care 
reforms, but does not guarantee health 
insurance for all Americans, should 
President (Bill) Clinton sign the bill or 
veto the bill? 
65 73 69 54 
CBS News/New York 
Times Poll 
Sep-94 President (Bill) Clinton said in January 
(1994) that he would veto any health 
care bill that did not provide insurance 
for all Americans. If Congress passes a 
health care bill that improves insurance 
coverage, but does not provide 
coverage for everybody, should 
President Clinton sign it, or should he 
veto it? 





Do you think President (Bill) Clinton 
should veto legislation which would 
make changes such as these in 
environmental policy (expanding 
logging, mining, and ranching on public 
lands, reducing protection for 
endangered species, opening up the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in 
Alaska to oil and gas exploration), or 
don't you feel that way? 




Nov-95 Do you think (President Bill) Clinton 
should sign the budget or veto it? 
33 80 55 24 
Gallup/CNN/USA 
Today Poll 
Nov-95 Currently the Republicans in Congress 
are in the final stages of completing an 
overall budget for the federal 
government. This is the budget bill that 
is intended to balance the federal 
budget within seven years, cut taxes, 
and cut the rate of spending on such 
programs as Medicare and Medicaid. 
From what you have heard or read so 
far about the Republican budget, do 
you think President (Bill) Clinton should 
60 81 62 29 
23 
 




Dec-95 As you may know, both houses of 
Congress have passed a bill to change 
the country's welfare system. Based on 
what you have read or heard about this 
bill, do you think President (Bill) Clinton 
should sign this bill or veto it? 
42 49 29 14 
Gallup Poll Aug-99 If Congress passes a Democrat-
sponsored bill to expand Medicare 
coverage to include prescription drugs 
for Medicare recipients, do you think 
President (Bill) Clinton should sign that 
bill into law, or should be veto the bill 
so it does not become law? 
10 3 11 20 
NBC News/Wall Street 
Journal Poll 
Apr-01 Recently, the United States Senate 
passed a campaign finance bill 
sponsored by Senators John McCain 
and Russ Feingold that would ban so-
called soft money contributions to the 
two national political parties, increase 
individual contribution limits, and 
restrict issue advertisements run by 
corporations, interest groups, and 
unions close to an election. Do you 
think that President (George W.) Bush 
should sign the bill or veto the bill, or do 
you not care either way? 
14 21 17 12 
NBC News/Wall Street 
Journal Poll 
Jun-01 During the spring (2001), the United 
States Senate passed a campaign 
finance bill sponsored by Senators 
John McCain and Russ Feingold that 
would ban so-called soft money 
contributions to the two national 
political parties, increase individual 
contribution limits, and restrict issue 
advertisements run by corporations, 
interest groups, and unions close to an 
election. If the bill reaches President 
(George W.) Bush, do you think that he 
should sign the bill or veto the bill, or do 
you not care either way? 
20 25 22 20 
NBC News/Wall Street 
Journal Poll 
Jun-01 During the spring (2001), the United 
States Senate passed a campaign 
finance bill that would ban so-called 
soft money contributions to the two 
national political parties, increase 
individual contribution limits, and 
restrict issue advertisements run by 
corporations, interest groups, and 
unions close to an election. If the bill 
reaches President (George W.) Bush, 
do you think that he should sign the bill 
or veto the bill, or do you not care 
either way? 
19 28 25 17 
Gallup/USA Today Poll Apr-07 As you may know, President (George 
W.) Bush has said he will veto a bill to 
expand federal funding for embryonic 
stem cell research. Do you think Bush 
should--or should not--veto this bill? 





Apr-07 As you may know, Democrats in both 
houses of Congress passed legislation 
that ties further funding of the war in 
Iraq to targeted dates for withdrawal of 
combat troops from Iraq. (George W.) 
Bush says he will veto any measure 
that sets such a timetable because he 
believes it would tie the hands of 
battlefield commanders and make 
defeat in Iraq more likely. Do you think 
that Bush should sign a funding 
authorization that includes a timetable 
for withdrawal, or should he veto that 
legislation? 
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1 Durr, Gilmour and Wolbrecht (1997) report that public approval of Congress increases 
after a veto. This is consistent with Groseclose and McCarty’s argument that Congress sends 
presidents popular bills to veto to rack up audience approval. 
2 The question used in the recent spate of research into public opinion on presidents’ 
unilateral efforts to make policy asks respondents to agree or disagree with the statement, “The 
president should not be able to veto legislation that has been passed by both chambers of 
Congress” (Reeves and Rogowski 2015). 
3 Even abstract questions appear to find respondents consulting their partisanship in 
deciding what they think about the president’s veto authority (Reeves and Rogowski 2015; 
Sievert and Williamson 2018).   
4 For more information on these surveys see Appendix A. To find these polls, we initially 
searched iPoll for the term “veto,” and from them identified those questions that asked 
specifically whether the president should sign or veto a bill.  In some instances, the details of the 
bill included in the question are hypothetical.  Other questions associating vote preferences and 
levels of disappointment with a veto or lack of it were excluded.   
5 More than two-thirds endorsed President Clinton’s 1998 threat to veto appropriation bills 
containing riders that relax environmental regulations.  Similarly, he succeeded in rallying public 
support for his State of the Union pledge to veto any health care reform bill that fell short of 
universal coverage; for spending bills containing cuts to Medicare and Medicaid; and for bills 
containing a widely perceived tax break for the wealthy.   
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6 When a similar question was asked about a potential veto of this bill a few months later, 
support increased to twenty percent. 
7 The only exception (August 1999) asked if the Democratic president should veto a 
Democratic bill.  The smallest gap observed between the president’s co-partisans and members 
of the opposition party, of five percentage points, was on whether George W. Bush should veto 
bipartisan-sponsored campaign finance reform.   
8 Both sets of differences are significant at .001. 
9 We add a dichotomous measure for the party of the president (with one indicating the 
president is a Democrat) We also estimated models with alternate specifications.  Some of these 
included additional controls for bill type or unified government (although all instances of 
questions about veto threats during unified government were for one bill – health care reform in 
1994).  While some of these controls were significant, we decided to present the results of these 
pared down models found in Table 2 for simplicity’s sake.  They yield the same conclusions 
about our variables of interest.   
10 While less than ideal, it represents the best alternative among approaches commonly 
used in political science.  Logistic regression models (that ignore this variation) and logistic 
regression models with clustered standard errors (that allows for the possibility of residuals 
correlated within surveys) produce similarly consistent estimates with one exception: education 
is not significant in model 2 when using logistic regression with clustered standard errors.  
Random effects logistic regression grouped by survey generates more accurate standard errors 
and conclusions about statistical significance compared to the other approaches.   
 
